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We studied the effects of negative cognitive style, sad mood, and facial affect on the self-face advantage
in a sample of 66 healthy individuals (mean age 26.5 years, range 1947 years). The sample was
subdivided into four groups according to inferential style and responsivity to sad mood induction.
Following a sad mood induction, we examined the effect on working memory of an incidental association
between facial affect, facial identity, and head-pose orientation. Overall, head-pose recognition was more
accurate for the self-face than for nonself face (self-face advantage, SFA). However, participants high in
negative cognitive style who experienced higher levels of sadness displayed a stronger SFA for sad
expressions than happy expressions. The remaining participants displayed an opposite bias (a stronger
SFA for happy expressions than sad expressions), or no bias. These findings highlight the importance of
trait-vulnerability status in the working memory biases related to emotional facial expressions.
Keywords: Self-face advantage; Working memory; Cognitive bias; Negative cognitive style; Emotion; Sad mood
induction.
Many studies have found that a negative cognitive
style, defined as the tendency to attribute negative
life events to stable, global, and internal causes, in
interaction with stressful life events, represents a
robust risk factor for depression (Alloy et al., 2000;
Alloy, Abramson, Keyser, Gerstein, & Sylvia,
2008). Depressed individuals show a memory
bias towards negative information and/or away
from positive information (Matt, Vazquez, &
Campbell, 1992). But are healthy individuals
with a negative cognitive style not only more
likely to become depressed, but also more likely
to experience a negative memory bias than in-
dividuals with more positive cognitive style?
A relation between negative cognitive style
and maladaptive information processing in
healthy individuals has been reported, for exam-
ple, by Romens, MacCoon, Ambramson, and
Pollak (2011). By using an attentional-blink
(AB) technique,1 they showed that a negative
cognitive style can alter the automatic allocation
of attention to emotional information. Romens
et al. found that, under conditions of limited
attentional resources, healthy participants high in
negative cognitive style in whom a negative mood
was induced were more likely than participants
with low or moderate negative cognitive style
to detect negative attribution words (e.g.,
‘‘failure’’), compared to nonself-relevant negative
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1 The AB refers to the phenomenon in which participants
show a reduced ability to report the second of two masked
targets when it appears within 200500 ms of the first.
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(e.g., ‘‘danger’’) or neutral (e.g., ‘‘fabric’’) words.
These data have been interpreted as indicating
that a negative cognitive style can modulate the
saliency of stimuli that are relevant to negative
self-attributions.
Drawing on cognitive diathesis-stress theories
(Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 2011; Ingram,
Atchley, & Segal, 2011), in the present study we
used a negative mood-induction (MI) procedure
to prime maladaptive information processing
prior to the assessment of Working Memory
(WM) performance for emotional faces (the self-
face and a stranger’s face) in nondepressed
individuals. According to diathesis-stress models
of depression, vulnerable individuals possess
maladaptive cognitive schemas that distinguish
them from nonvulnerable individuals. When acti-
vated by an external or internal stressor, these
latent negative self-schemas generate maladaptive
cognitive processes, such as negative interpreta-
tive, attentional, or memory biases (Abramson
et al., 2002; Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005). WM
biases related to emotional processing are parti-
cularly important because they have been linked to
the development and perpetuation of mood dis-
orders (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010).
Previous research indicates that, when self cues
are present (such as a picture of the participant’s
own face), enhanced processing in the form of a
memory advantage occurs, even if explicit instruc-
tions related to the self are not provided (e.g.,
Kesebir & Oishi, 2010). Therefore, we expected
that participants would demonstrate better WM
recognition for the self-face than for stranger’s
faces (Ma & Han, 2009, 2010). Importantly, the
stimulus set of the present experiment included
the sad self-face, because negative information
related to the self, as opposed to negative
information in general, provides the most sensi-
tive test of biased memory in vulnerable (and
depressed) individuals (Ramel et al., 2007;
Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2012; Wisco, 2009).
The purpose of our study was to relate the self-
face advantage to facial affect, negative cognitive
style, and sad mood. To our knowledge, no data
have been published on abnormal memory for
emotional faces when participants are asked to
memorise images of their own face.
We considered the healthy individuals of our
sample to be at ‘‘low or high cognitive risk’’
depending on their scores on the Cognitive Style
Questionnaire (CSQ; Alloy et al., 2000; Haeffel
et al., 2008). We also assumed that mood induc-
tion would precipitate maladaptive information
processing only if participants had experienced a
strong mood shift. By crossing ‘‘cognitive risk’’
(low, high) with individual responsivity to mood
induction (weak, strong), we divided the partici-
pants into four groups (see Table 1).
In the encoding display, four photographs were
shown. Two pictures depicted the participant’s
own face and two pictures portrayed a stranger’s
face, with happy and sad expressions. Pictures of
the self-face were used in the attempt to heighten
self-focus as an activating agent for latent nega-
tive self-schemas (Hedlund & Rude, 1995). Parti-
cipants provided old/new judgements about
whether a successively presented probe face had
the same head-pose orientation as in the encoding
display (Figure 1). This procedure allowed us to
measure the impact of self-referencing on unin-
tentional encoding of affective facial expressions.
Incidental encoding is less susceptible to con-
scious explicit processing, whereby individuals
can alter their more automatic, schema-driven
responses (Haeffel et al., 2007). The following
three hypotheses were formulated.
Hypothesis 1: Individuals at high cognitive risk
with a strong response to sad mood induction
will display a stronger self-face advantage for
sad expressions than happy expressions. In fact,
TABLE 1
Participant characteristics
hCRsR
(n16)
hCRwR
(n17)
lCRsR
(n19)
lCRwR
(n14)
Age 26.8 (1.6) 27.1 (1.3) 25.7 (0.3) 26.7 (1.1)
Gender ratio
(F/M)
14/2 10/7 16/3 10/4
BDI-II 9.8 (2.2)
[3.0, 35.0]
13.9 (1.7)
[4.0, 31.0]
5.2 (1.2)
[0.0, 17.0]
9.1 (2.0)
[0.0, 25.0]
CSQ 4.2 (0.1)
[3.7, 5.4]
4.1 (0.1)
[3.7, 5.1]
3.1 (0.1)
[2.1, 3.6]
3.2 (0.1)
[2.0, 3.6]
RRS 36.7 (2.9)
[22.0, 68.0]
43.4 (2.9)
[28.0, 74.0]
30.2 (1.4)
[22.0, 42.0]
38.6 (2.5)
[25.0, 57.0]
VAS-dif 7.1 (0.3) 2.5 (0.3) 6.8 (0.3) 3.0 (0.4)
BDI-II is Beck Depression Inventory Second Edition.
CSQ is Cognitive Style Questionnaire. RRS is Ruminative
Response Scale. VAS-dif is the difference between the
postinduction and the preinduction mood checks measured
with the Visual Analogue Scale. hCRsR: participants at high
cognitive risk with a strong response to sad mood induction;
hCRwR: participants at high cognitive risk with a weak
response to sad mood induction; lCRsR: participants at low
cognitive risk with a strong response to sad mood induction;
lCRwR: participants at low cognitive risk with a weak
response to sad mood induction. SD is shown in parentheses.
The range of values is indicated in square brackets.
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cognitive diathesis-stress models predict that,
when activated, latent negative schemas gener-
ate a mood-congruent memory bias that causes
negative information to become more salient and
accessible, especially when it refers to the self.2
Hypothesis 2: Individuals at high cognitive risk
with a weak response to sad mood induction will
display a stronger self-face advantage for happy
expressions than sad expressions. If negative
self-schemas are dormant (not activated by a
sufficiently strong emotional challenge), dys-
functional processing will not occur (Bistricky,
Ingram, & Atchley, 2011; Scher et al., 2005). In
these conditions, we expect to find the same self-
positivity bias typically exhibited by nonvulner-
able individuals (Watson, Dritschel, Obonsawin,
& Jentzsch, 2007).
Hypothesis 3: Individuals at low cognitive risk
will display a stronger self-face advantage for
happy expressions than sad expressions. If latent
negative self-schemas are absent, we expect to
find a self-positivity bias because resilient indivi-
duals tend to show an overoptimistic cognitive
bias which provides motivational and mood-
buffering benefits (Forgas & East, 2008). We have
no predictions concerning the relation between
responsivity to sad MI and strength of the self-
face advantage in individuals at low cognitive risk.
A memory bias towards the happy self-face is
adaptive, because it may protect against negative
mood and loss of self-esteem. Conversely, a memory
bias towards the sad self-face is maladaptive, be-
cause it may result in a distorted mental representa-
tion of the social environment and it may contribute
to negative self-appraisal and low self-concept.
METHOD
Participants
Sixty-six Caucasian undergraduate students (16
males, 50 females; mean age: 26.5 years; SD: 4.5;
range: 1947 years) of the University of Firenze
(Italy), with no history of neurological or psychia-
tric disorders, volunteered to take part in the
current study. Participants were divided by median
split into four groups based on their scores on the
Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CSQ; Alloy
et al., 2000) and on their response to sad MI: (1)
high Cognitive Risk strong Response to sad MI
(hCRsR, n16), (2) high Cognitive Risk weak
Response to sad MI (hCRwR, n17), (3) low
Cognitive Risk strong Response to sad MI (lCRsR,
n19), (4) low Cognitive Risk weak Response to
sad MI (lCRwR, n14). All participants gave
informed written consent prior to taking part in the
study, but were not informed of the true purpose of
the study until the debriefing session. The study
was approved by the Departmental Ethics Com-
mittee, Dipartimento di Psicologia, Universita`
degli Studi di Firenze, Italy.
Figure 1. An example trial. After a fixation mark, an encoding display containing four faces, a blank screen (ISI1500 ms), a memory
probe, and another blank screen were presented sequentially. The participants reported whether the probe face had the same head-pose
orientation as the spatially corresponding face in the encoding display. ‘‘New’’ faces differed from ‘‘old’’ faces in terms of head
orientation (308 right or left), whereas face identity (self-face or stranger’s face) and facial expression (happy or sad) remained constant.
2 When using lists of affective words, evidence of a mood-
congruent memory bias in depressed and dysphoric indivi-
duals is especially evident for words considered in relation to
the self (e.g., Hertel, 2004).
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Measures
The Beck Depression InventoryII (BDI-II;
Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a well-validated
21-item self-report inventory of cognitive, affec-
tive, and neurovegetative depressive symptoms
experienced in the past 2 weeks. We used the
Italian version of the BDI-II (Ghisi, Flebus,
Montano, Sanavio, & Sica, 2006; Sica & Ghisi,
2007). In the present study, the a coefficient
(Cronbach’s alpha) was .93, confirming internal
consistency reliability.
The Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CSQ;
Alloy et al., 2000) is a 48-item self-report measure
of cognitive and behavioural coping strategies.
Participants rate the probable consequences of 12
negative events (six interpersonal and six achieve-
ment events) and the implications of each event
for the self-concept. The participants’ inferences
regarding the cause, consequence, and self-worth
implications of each hypothetical negative event
are assessed to measure the three components
featured in the hopelessness theory of depression
(Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). The CSQ
was translated into Italian as a part of a more
comprehensive study on the role of cognitive
variables in psychological disorders, and in parti-
cular in depression (Sica, Caudek, Chiri, Ghisi, &
Marchetti, 2012). In the present study, the internal
consistency (a) coefficients were .81, .93, and
.94 for the ‘‘Cause’’, ‘‘Consequence’’, and ‘‘Self-
worth implications’’ subscales, respectively.
The Visual Analogue Scale (VAS; McCormack,
Horne, & Sheather, 1988) is a self-report device
used to measure respondents’ perceptions of their
own mood (e.g., Scherrer & Dobson, 2009).
Participants rate their mood by placing a vertical
mark on a 100 mm line, marked with ‘‘Not at all
sad’’ on the left end and ‘‘Extremely sad’’ on the
right. A score from 0 to 100 is derived by
measuring the distance of the mark from the left
pole. Participants completed the VAS before and
then after the mood induction. VAS-dif was
computed by subtracting the postinduction
mood check from its baseline (e.g., Watkins,
Teasdale, & Williams, 2003).
The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993) of the Response
Styles Questionnaire includes 22 items describing
the tendency to ruminate in response to depressed
mood. The RRS assesses responses to dysphoric
mood that are focused on the self, on symptoms,
or on possible consequences and causes of moods.
We used the Italian version of the RRS (Palmieri,
Gasparre, & Lanciano, 2007). In the present study,
the internal consistency (a) coefficients were .84,
.91, and .88 for the ‘‘Brooding’’, ‘‘Reflection’’, and
‘‘Depression’’ subscales, respectively.
Sad mood induction
Participants were instructed to listen to Proko-
fiev’s Alexander Nevsky: Russia under the Mon-
golian Yoke played at half speed (Rowe, Hirsh, &
Anderson, 2007) and to recall three experiences
that made them feel lonely, rejected, defeated, or
hurt (Singer & Dobson, 2007). Immediately after
they had finished listening to the music, partici-
pants were instructed to watch a video clip in
order to increase their emotional engagement and
to maintain their sad mood (Jallais & Gilet, 2010).
The video was a 3-minute scene of a boy crying
over his father’s death from the movie The Champ
(Lovell & Zeffirelli, 1979). Previous studies have
tested the reliability of this clip to elicit sadness
(Hewig et al., 2005). Each participant was alone
while undergoing the mood induction.
Stimuli
In a pretest session, a total of 16 pictures was
taken for each participant’s positive and negative
facial expressions, with a 308 left or a 308 right
head orientation. Happy and sad expressions
resulted from instructions to the participants to
display prototypical, strong expressions of these
emotions. To select the images that best repre-
sented each of the two facial expressions, the two
authors and three undergraduate students rated
the intensity of the facial expression of each
picture on a Likert scale ranging from 7 (sad)
to 0 (neutral) to 7 (happy) (Jermann, Van der
Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2008). A final set of
eight happy and eight sad pictures was selected
for each participant by choosing the pictures that
obtained the highest positive and negative scores
on the intensity scale. The pictures used in each
trial of the experiment were randomly selected
from these two final sets.
The encoding display consisted of four faces:
two pictures of the participant and two picture of
a stranger of the same sex, race, and approxi-
mately the same age. To control for low-level
differences in visual salience, each participant
was randomly coupled with another participant.
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Within each pair, the self images of one partici-
pant were used as the nonself images of the other.
Each of the two facial identities displayed a happy
and a sad facial expression. All faces were
cropped to remove external features by the
application of the same oval mask and were
presented on a black background.
Face images were shown with a 308 left or a 308
right head orientation. Each of the 16 possible
combinations of head-pose orientation in the
encoding display was presented with the same
probability in the course of the experiment. The
relative spatial positions (top left, top right, bottom
left, bottom right) of the four faces (happy self-
face, happy nonself face, sad self-face, sad nonself
face) were determined randomly on each trial.
‘‘New’’ probe faces were generated by reflec-
tion about a vertical axis. Therefore, a ‘‘new’’
probe face was identical to the spatially corre-
sponding face in the encoding display, except for
the head-pose orientation (308 left rather than 308
right, or vice versa). The probe display consisted
of four items: the probe face and three scrambled
face photographs (see Figure 1).
Procedure
During an initial session that took place not more
than 2 days before the experiment, participants
completed a battery of three self-report scales:
BDI-II, CSQ, and RRS. In the experimental
sessions, prior to the mood inductions, partici-
pants rated their baseline mood with the VAS, for
which they were instructed to focus on how they
were feeling at that moment. They were then
asked to get into a negative mood state using the
music, the imagery suggested by the mood induc-
tion procedure and the movie, and to stay in that
state until the whole session was completed.
Following the induction, the mood check was
administered again. Then the participants com-
pleted the experiment.
The trial sequence is illustrated in Figure 1.
The experiment comprised 512 trials (256 ‘‘new’’
and 256 ‘‘old’’) randomly mixed up across parti-
cipants. Participants were instructed to respond
‘‘same’’ with a keypress if the probe matched the
spatially corresponding face in the encoding dis-
play in terms of head-pose orientation, and
‘‘different’’ otherwise. No feedback was provided
for correct or incorrect responses. Each response
was followed by a 1000 ms intertrial interval
(blank screen).
Following the completion of the memory ex-
periment, participants were asked to return to
their normal frame of mind and they were thor-
oughly debriefed concerning the purpose of re-
search. Those participants who showed a
continued response to the sad mood manipulation
were cheered up by the experimenter to neutralise
any increase in depression due to the sad mood
induction procedure. Participants were encour-
aged to contact the experimenter in case they
were experiencing any long-lasting sad mood.
Each participant was contacted by phone after 1
week and 3 weeks. None of the participants
reported any problem caused by our procedure.
Data analysis
A measure of the ability of participants to
determine whether the probe replicated or not
the head-pose orientation in the encoding display
is provided by the sensitivity index d? used in
signal detection theory. The statistic d? can be
computed as d?z (hit rate)  z (false alarm
rate). Equivalently, d? can be estimated by a
probit regression (DeCarlo, 1998, 2010),3 with
the advantage that, when the analysis is framed as
a regression model, other predictor variables can
be considered (Wright, Horry, & Skagerberg,
2009). By following this second approach, we
used a mixed-effect linear model with binomial
error structure and a probit link function4 to
analyse the participants’ binary responses, with
participants and items as crossed random effects,
and Faceold (whether the probe was old or new)
and Condition (‘‘happy self-face’’, ‘‘happy nonself
face’’, ‘‘sad self-face’’, ‘‘sad nonself face’’) as fixed
effects. These analyses were performed using the
lme4 package (Bates & Sarkar, 2007) for the R
statistical environment (version 2.15.1, R Core
Team, 2012). We allowed the participants’ accu-
racy to vary by adding to the random part of the
3 Let Y1, . . ., Yn be the realisation of n independent binary
random variables, with probability of success Pr(Yi1)pi.
The pi are related to a set of q predictors x. Let xij denote the
value of predictor j (j1, . . ., q) for subject i (i1, . . . , n). The
probit regression model is piF (hi), where hiSj bjx ij is
called the linear predictor and F is the standard Gaussian
cumulative distribution function.
4 The link function g( ) connects the expected value of the
response variable, piE(Yi), i1, . . ., n, to the linear
predictor: g(pi)hi and allows for a nonlinear relationship
between pi and hi. The probit link function transforms pi so
that the regression curve for pi takes the form of the Gaussian
cumulative distribution function.
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model both a term for the variance of accuracy
and the covariance between accuracy and re-
sponding ‘‘old’’. An advantage of the mixed-
effect analyses over the traditional approach
(where an ANOVA is performed on the d? scores
computed for each participant in each cell of the
factorial design), is the possibility to specify
crossed (or partially crossed) random effects for
participants and items (see also Caudek, in press;
Wright & London, 2009). In this respect, mixed
models can replace the by-subjects (F1) and by-
items (F2) ANOVAs (Judd, Westfall, & Kenny,
2012). Including additional random effects for
items is especially important in the present case
because a different set of pictures was used for
each pair of participants.
We evaluated the effect of the variable Condi-
tion by computing the deviance statistics (minus 2
times the log-likelihood) of nested models;
change in deviance is distributed as chi-square,
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
parameters deleted from the model (e.g., Baayen,
Davidson, & Bates, 2008). In the presence of a
statistically significant result, two planned com-
parisons (‘‘self’’ vs. ‘‘nonself’’) were conducted:
one for happy faces and one for sad faces. The
per-comparison a was therefore set at .025.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Participant profile
Analysis of the participants’ characteristics re-
vealed that the four groups described in Table 1
did not differ significantly in terms of their age,
F(3, 62)0.31, p.82, or gender ratio, v23 ¼ 4:69,
p.20. Participants at ‘‘high cognitive risk’’
(hCRsR and hCRwR groups) scored signific-
antly higher on the CSQ measure than did the
participants at ‘‘low cognitive risk’’ (lCRsR and
lCRwR groups), Mhigh4.18, Mlow3.14, Welch
t(63.47)9.88, p.001. Participants with a
strong response to sad MI (hCRsR and lCRsR
groups) had higher VAS-dif scores than did
participants with a weak response to sad MI
(hCRwR and lCRwR groups), Mstrong6.91,
Mweak2.75, Welch t(61.44)14.27, p.001.
Prior to testing Hypotheses 1 and 2, we verified
that a negative mood had been induced in the
same degree in the two groups classified as
displaying a strong response to sad MI. The
mean VAS-dif score did not significantly differ
between the hCRsR group (M7.06, SE0.27)
and the lCRsR group (M6.78, SE0.37),
Welch t(32.7)0.72, p.47. Furthermore, the
mean VAS-dif score did not significantly differ
between the hCRwR group (M2.50, SE0.26)
and the lCRwR group (M3.05, SE0.37),
Welch t(24.0)1.22, p.23.
The four groups differed in terms of their
average BDI-II, F(3, 62)4.52, p.006, and
RRS, F(3, 62)5.31, p.003, scores. Post hoc
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated
higher average scores on both variables in the
hCRwR group (BDI: M13.88, SE1.70; RSS:
M43.41, SE2.94) relative to the lCRwR
group (BDI: mean difference5.21, SE1.16;
RSS: mean difference30.16, SE1.42). No
other pairwise comparisons among the four
groups were significant with respect to the mean
BDI-II or RRS scores. The correlations among
the BDI-II, CSQ, RRS, and VAS-dif scores are
shown in Table 2.
Effect of sad mood induction
The mood induction produced significant changes
in VAS self-rated sadness. Postinduction sadness
was significantly higher than preinduction
sadness: Mean change in mood was 49.6 mm,
SD24.0, t(65)16.80, p.001.
Self-face advantage in head-pose recognition
accuracy
When considering the full sample of 66 parti-
cipants, a self-face processing advantage emerged
for both happy faces (self-face: d?2.01, nonself-
face: d?1.70, z6.28, p.001) and sad faces
TABLE 2
Correlation matrix among the BDI-II, CSQ, RRS, and VAS-dif
scores
BDI-II CSQ RRS VAS-dif
BDI-II 1.0
CSQ .37 (.01) 1.0
RRS .82 (.001) .35(.02) 1.0
VAS-dif .23 (.13) .08 (.52) .35 (.01) 1.0
BDI-II is Beck Depression Inventory Second Edition.
CSQ is Cognitive Style Questionnaire. RRS is Ruminative
Response Scale. VAS-dif is the difference between the
postinduction and the preinduction mood checks measured
with the Visual Analogue Scale. The values shown in the
parentheses are the probability values adjusted for multiple
tests.
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(self-face: d?1.93, nonself face: d?1.62, z
6.61, p.001)5*see Figure 2. This result is
consistent with previous findings (Keenan,
Wheeler, Gallup, & Pascual-Leone, 2000; Keyes
& Brady, 2010).
The novel result of the present study is that the
self-face advantage is modulated by (1) facial
affect, (2) negative cognitive style, and (3) re-
sponse to sad mood induction. Figure 3 shows
recognition performance for head-pose orienta-
tion as a function of condition (‘‘happy self-face’’,
‘‘happy nonself face’’, ‘‘sad self-face’’, ‘‘sad non-
self face’’) in the four groups of participants.
Although overall average accuracy did not vary
across groups (d?hCRsR1.81, d?hCRwR1.89,
d?lCRsR1.83, d?lCRwR1.82), v23 ¼ 0:04, p.99,6
there was a statistically significant Condition
Group interaction, v29 ¼ 31:80, p.001. Hence,
the effects of condition on recognition accuracy
were examined separately in each group.
Participants at high cognitive risk with a strong
response to sad MI. Memory for head-pose
orientation was modulated by condition,
v26 ¼ 40:37, p.001. Participants were more accu-
rate responding to the self-face than to the
nonself face for sad facial expressions, Dd?
0.52, z5.59, p.001. No difference in recogni-
tion accuracy between self and nonself faces was
found for happy facial expressions, Dd?0.16, z
1.74, p.082.
Participants at high cognitive risk with a weak
response to sad MI. Memory for head-pose
orientation was modulated by condition,
v26 ¼ 17:34, p.001. Participants were more accu-
rate responding to the self-face than to the
nonself face for happy facial expressions, Dd?
0.25, z2.65, p.001. No difference in recogni-
tion accuracy between self and nonself faces was
found for sad facial expressions, Dd?0.10, z
1.11, p.268.
Participants at low cognitive risk with a strong
response to sad MI. Memory for head-pose
orientation was modulated by condition,
v26 ¼ 71:25, p.001. A self-face advantage was
found for happy expressions, Dd?0.66, z6.87,
p.001, and for sad expressions, Dd?0.37, z
4.01, p.001. However, the self-face advantage
was stronger for happy expressions than for sad
expressions, v21 ¼ 4:31, p.038.
Participants at low cognitive risk with a weak
response to sad MI. Memory for head-pose
orientation was not modulated by condition,
v26 ¼ 8:06, p.234.
A separate analysis indicated that the size of
the self-face advantage (i.e., the d’ difference in
head-pose orientation recognition between the
self-face and a stranger’s face) varied across the
four groups described above, v23 ¼ 16:58, p.001.
For the group represented in Figure 3c, the self-
face advantage was significantly larger than for
the groups represented in Figures 3a, Dd?0.19,
z2.06, p.040, 3b, Dd?0.33, z3.47, p.001,
and 3d, Dd?0.38, z3.87, p.001.
Self-face advantage in the reaction times
Previous research has shown that observers
respond faster to their own face than to unfami-
liar faces (Keenan et al., 2000; Tong & Nakayama,
1999). We replicated this finding: On average,
response latencies to the self-face were 35 ms
Figure 2. Sensitivity for head-pose (orientation) recognition
as a function of Condition (self happy, other happy, self sad,
other sad) in the whole sample of 66 participants. Error bars
indicate91 standard error. *pB .05, **pB .01, ***pB .001.
5 When computing d? separately for each participant and
each condition with traditional Signal Detection Theory
methods, we obtained the following mean sensitivity values
in the full sample of 66 participants: d?self happy1.99, d?nonself
happy1.69, d?self sad1.92, d?nonself sad1.58. These values are
almost identical to those found with a multilevel model: d?self
happy2.01, d?nonself happy1.70, d?self sad1.93, d?nonself sad
1.62 (for a discussion, see Wright & London, 2009). Impor-
tantly, the addition of a random intercept for items signifi-
cantly improves model fit, v21 ¼ 11:35, p .001.
6 Analysis of response bias did not yield significant group
differences in terms of criterion C, F(3, 62)0.31, p .82, or
false alarm rates, F(3, 62)0.282, p .84.
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faster than response latencies to unfamiliar faces,
v21 ¼ 11:40, p.002. Response times were not
affected by group (hCRsR, hCRwR, lCRsR,
lCRwR), by valence (happy, sad), or by their
interaction, v214 ¼ 10:88, p.69.
Self-face advantage and alternative
classifications of participants
To further evaluate the hypotheses described
earlier, we created for comparison three alterna-
tive classifications of participants. In a first classi-
fication, two extreme groups were created by
dividing participants into quartiles based on their
CSQ scores, regardless of their response to the sad
MI. In a second classification, two extreme groups
were created by dividing participants into quartiles
based on their response to the sad MI, regardless of
their CSQ scores. A further classification of
participants was based on their BDI-II scores. In
all cases, only participants in the highest and lowest
quartiles were retained for further analysis. The
mean scores for the high and low quartile groups
were 4.47 (SE0.10, n16) and 2.80 (SE0.09,
n16) for the CSQ split, 7.95 (SE0.19, n16)
and 1.74 (SE0.09, n16) for the VAS-dif split,
and 20.25 (SE1.48, n16) and 1.78 (SE0.31,
n18) for the BDI-II split, respectively.
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Figure 3. d? sensitivity for head-pose (orientation) recognition as a function of Condition (self happy, other happy, self sad, other
sad) in each group. hCRsR: participants at high cognitive risk with a strong response to sad mood induction; hCRwR: participants at
high cognitive risk with a weak response to sad mood induction; lCRsR: participants at low cognitive risk with a strong response to
sad mood induction; lCRwR: participants at low cognitive risk with a weak response to sad mood induction. Error bars indicate91
standard error. *pB .05, **pB .01, ***pB .001.
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Statistical analyses were performed as de-
scribed previously, and significant differences for
self versus nonself face comparisons are reported
in Table 3 (a.025). The main result of these
analyses is that none of these alternative classifi-
cation criteria was able to discriminate between
participants who displayed a maladaptive WM
bias for the self-face from those who did not.
Sad benefit in head-pose recognition accuracy
Earlier, we compared the recognition accuracy
between the self and nonself face, for different
expressions. In a further set of analyses, we
compared the recognition accuracy between the
happy and sad expressions. With these analyses,
we found no evidence of a sad benefit in any
group of participants. On the contrary, we found
an advantage for happy faces over sad faces when
considering the nonself face pictures in the group
of participants at high cognitive risk with a strong
response to sad MI, Dd?0.21, z2.31, p.021,
and when considering the self-face pictures in the
group of participants at low cognitive risk with a
strong response to sad MI, Dd?0.27, z2.80,
p.005.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In our study, healthy volunteers performed a
head-pose (orientation) recognition task. The
stimuli depicted either the participant’s own face
or unknown faces, with happy or sad expressions
(Figure 1). We found a strong self-reference effect
(i.e., better head-pose recognition for the self-face
than for stranger’s faces), but also marked in-
dividual differences. Some participants displayed
a self-face advantage for sad expressions, whereas
others displayed a stronger self-face advantage
for happy expressions. Consistent with diathesis-
stress theories, these individual differences were
associated with trait-like factors (negative cogni-
tive style) and affective states (response to sad
mood induction).
. Participants who scored above the sample
median on both CSQ and VAS-dif displayed
a self-face advantage for sad but not happy
faces (Figure 3a). This result indicates that,
when experiencing an affective challenge
(strong sad mood induction), participants
high in negative cognitive style display
a negative self-referential memory bias
(Hypothesis 1).
. Participants who scored above the sample
median on CSQ but below the median on
VAS-dif displayed a self-face advantage for
happy but not sad faces (Figure 3b). When
not distressed, participants high in negative
cognitive style do not exhibit a negative self-
referential bias (Hypothesis 2). This result is
in line with schema models, which postulate
that latent negative schemas becomes acti-
vated only in distressing situations (Clark,
Beck, & Alford, 1999; Ingram, 1984), but not
with impaired cognitive control accounts,
which postulate that cognitive biases operate
as long as the cognitive control impairments
persist, regardless of a negative mood state
(see Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007).
. Participants who scored below the sample
median on CSQ and above the median on
VAS-dif displayed a stronger self-face ad-
vantage for happy faces than for sad faces
(Hypothesis 3)*see Figure 3c. This result is
consistent with an asymmetric recall favour-
ing positive information among psychologi-
cally resilient individuals (Matt et al., 1992).
Note, moreover, that the self-face advantage
was stronger for the group of participants
TABLE 3
Recognition sensitivity (d’) for head-pose (orientation) as a
function of condition (happy self-face, happy nonself face, sad
self-face, sad nonself face)
CSQ VAS-dif BDI-II
High quartile group
Happy self-face 1.96 (0.06) 2.16 (0.10) 1.56 (0.08)
Happy nonself-face 1.72 (0.06) 1.76 (0.08) 1.32 (0.07)
Sad self-face 1.88 (0.06) 2.16 (0.09) 1.45 (0.08)
Sad nonself-face 1.66 (0.06) 1.63 (0.08) 1.22 (0.08)
Low quartile group
Happy self-face 2.03 (0.10) 2.05 (0.09) 2.20 (0.09)
Happy nonself-face 1.63 (0.09) 1.73 (0.08) 1.75 (0.07)
Sad self-face 1.89 (0.09) 1.85 (0.08) 2.03 (0.08)
Sad nonself-face 1.72 (0.09) 1.70 (0.10) 1.63 (0.09)
Classifications of participants are based on upper and
lower quartile splits on CSQ, VAS-dif, or BDI-II scores. BDI-
II is Beck Depression Inventory Second Edition. CSQ is
Cognitive Style Questionnaire. VAS-dif is the difference
between the postinduction and the preinduction mood
checks measured with the Visual Analogue Scale.
Statistically significant differences between the self and the
nonself conditions are highlighted in bold. When the self-face
effect was statistically significant for both happy and sad faces,
we found no statistical evidence that its size differed across
happy and sad faces within any group defined by these
alternative classifications. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
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represented in Figure 3c than for the other
three groups (Figures 3a, 3b, and 3d). This
result is in agreement with previous studies
showing that sad mood, alone and/or in
combination with arousal, increases self-
focused attention in healthy individuals
(e.g., Panayiotou, Brown, & Vrana, 2007).7
. Finally, participants who scored below the
sample median on both CSQ and VAS-
dif displayed no self-face advantage at all
(Figure 3d). Previous research has indicated
effects of state affect on information proces-
sing style.8 The results reported in Figures 3c
and 3d indicate that mood level can mod-
ulate the self-face effect, also when latent
negative schemas are absent.
Emotional faces have been used to study the
mood-congruent memory bias in patients with
depression and in individuals with sub-clinical
dysphoria or induced sad mood. A long-term
memory bias for sad faces has been found in
patients with depression (Gilboa-Schechtman,
Erhard-Weiss, & Jeczemien, 2002; Ridout, Astell,
Reid, Glen, & O’Carroll, 2003), in individuals
experiencing dysphoria (Jermann et al., 2008;
Ridout, Noreen, & Johal, 2009), and in indivi-
duals in an induced sad mood (Ridout, Dritschel,
et al., 2009). A short-term memory bias for sad
faces has been found in patients with melancholic
depression (Linden, Jackson, Subramanian,
Healy, & Linden, 2011), but not in individuals
with subclinical dysphoria (Noreen & Ridout,
2010). The results of these studies show abnormal
recognition memory for faces displaying sadness
in depressed and depression-susceptible groups,
or after an experimentally induced sad mood. The
present study adds to previous findings by con-
sidering not only the facial affect, but also the
distinction between the self-face and the nonself
face. We showed that individuals high in negative
cognitive style, when distressed, show a bias
towards the negative self-face (with respect to
the negative nonself face), even within brief
short-term memory episodes. Conversely, we
found no evidence of a ‘‘sad benefit’’ during
WM processing (see also Noreen & Ridout,
2010).
One methodological novelty of the present
study is the use of pictures of the participant’s
own face for the study of emotional face proces-
sing in WM. A processing advantage for the self-
face has been found in many behavioural tasks.
Participants respond faster to their own faces than
to faces of unfamiliar or familiar others in visual
search (Tong & Nakayama, 1999). For the self-
face, performance is better in face identification
tasks (Keenan et al., 1999) and in head orienta-
tion identification tasks (Ma & Han, 2010; Sui &
Han, 2007). Moreover, self-referential encoding
strategies enhance memory to a greater degree
than other encoding strategies (Grilli & Glisky,
2010; Kesebir & Oishi, 2010). Turk, Cunningham,
and Macrae (2008) showed that the self-reference
effect emerges also in the case of an incidental
pairings between the photographic image of the
participant’s own face and the target words,
without any direct evaluative processing of the
face images. By using a head-pose recognition
task, we extended these findings by showing that
the self-reference effect emerges also under con-
ditions of incidental association between head-
pose orientation and face identity. Moreover, we
showed that the incidental associations between
self and target information can impact on mem-
ory performance in opposite ways, depending on
facial affect and cognitive style.
The biases illustrated in Figure 3 cannot be
accounted for by differences in cognitive impair-
ment, because the four groups did not differ in
overall memory performance or in the average
latency of the participants’ responses. Moreover,
the results of Figure 3 cannot be attributed to
differences in rumination (Raes, Hermans, &
Williams, 2006) or dysphoric affect. We found
higher RRS and BDI-II scores in the hCRwR
group than in the lCRsR group, but this does not
explain why a maladaptive WM bias was only
found in the hCRsR group.
A few limitations of this study along with
questions for future research should be noted.
(1) From the present data we cannot deter-
mine whether the WM biases for emotional
faces illustrated in Figure 3 depend on selective
attention at encoding and/or on biased retrieval
7 For example, Sedikides (1992) found that participants in
whom a sad mood had been induced produced a larger
number of references to the self when asked to tell a story
than those in whom a happy or neutral mood had been
induced. Wood, Saltzberg, and Goldsamt (1990) found that, in
a sentence-completion task, participants induced to feel sad
produced a higher number of first-person singular pronouns
than those induced to feel happy or neutral.
8 Positive mood is associated with using stereotypes and
global processing, whereas negative mood is associated with
greater accuracy, lower false positive recognition, resistance to
heuristic error, and local processing (e.g., Gasper & Clore,
2001).
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processes. (2) Although we have operationalised
the negative cognitive style with the CSQ scores,
it would be interesting to complement the present
results with other measures such as the Dysfunc-
tional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck,
1978). (3) Participants selection could be im-
proved so as to create more extreme groups. (4)
The analyses described earlier could benefit by
use of the Center for Epidemiologic Studies
Depression Scale (CES-D) rather than the BDI-
II scale. (5) Our task involved a decision con-
cerning the head-pose orientation of the probe
face, whereas the emotional valence and the
identity of the faces were irrelevant to the task.
The incidental encoding of facial affect had the
purpose of activating unintentionally automatic
and schema-driven responses, independent of de-
liberative, explicit processes (e.g., Haeffel et al.,
2007). Future research could establish how the
results vary if participants are asked to explicitly
process the emotional valence or the identity of
the faces during the encoding phase.9 (6) Future
research could also establish how the results vary
if participants are asked to perform a long-term
memory task. (7) The four groups of participants
likely differed also on other characteristics. Thus,
more research is needed to establish whether
other variables (e.g., personality or temperament)
may have contributed to the current results. (8)
Gotlib and Joormann (2010) remarked that only
few investigations have tested the diathesis-stress
model by assessing biased processing prior to the
first onset of depression. This is exactly what we
have done here. However, they also pointed out
that this assessment represents only a first step to
establish whether biased processing can predict
depression following the experience of a negative
life event. This question needs to be addressed in
future research, together with the study of nega-
tive cognitions about the self face in clinically
depressed individuals.
In conclusion, our study indicates that negative
mood, when experienced by individuals high in
negative cognitive style, can activate a maladap-
tive WM bias in which the self-face is remem-
bered better than a stranger’s face, but only for
sad expressions. When tested under conditions
that do not provoke their vulnerability, indivi-
duals high in negative cognitive style do not
display this WM bias, and neither do individuals
low in negative cognitive style.
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